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1 INTRODUCTION 
Earlier studies are inconsistent on whether mergers and acquisitions have positive 
effects for acquiring firms1. The major risk for shareholders of the bidder is that the 
target fails to perform up to expectations, thus resulting in overpayment. As a tool 
intended to resolve challenges related to mispricing, bidders often choose to structure 
their acquisition agreements as earnouts. An earnout is a deal type where a portion of 
the purchase price of a firm is contingent on a pre-agreed performance measure. 
Talking to deal professionals, earnouts is, among other things, used to bridge the 
gap between bidder and target value estimates. However, including a contingent 
payment also has some drawbacks. Due to practicalities regarding measurement of the 
earnout’s performance measure, it is difficult to integrate the target. Given that 
synergy effects then is postponed, it is interesting that earnouts often are assumed to 
create more positive cash flow consequences for the acquirer than under terms which 
allow for immediate integration.  
The main purpose of this thesis is to provide empirical evidence on whether the 
choice of including an earnout can be considered rational. In total, 33 Nordic 
acquisitions are being investigated from the perspective of the acquirer, looking for 
changes in fundamental value, revenue and EBITDA2 margin. Fundamental value in 
this context is the result obtained when performing valuation according to residual 
income valuation approach.  
Results suggest that there is no significant difference in cash flow consequence 
between the two types of structures. This applies to change in fundamental value of 
acquirers, EBITDA margin and revenue effects.  
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 provide a short 
background and overview of the Nordic market for mergers and acquisitions. Section 
3 provides a basic understanding of the theory on the subject. Section 4 reviews 
existing research, mainly focusing on deal valuation and earnout studies. Based on the 
foundation created through section 2 to 4, section 5 presents the hypotheses used in 
the empirical study. The methodology employed to test these hypothesis is described 
                                                 
1 Bruner (2002) report 1/3 value increase, 1/3 value destruction and 1/3 value conservation 
2 Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation 
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in section 6, and the data used in section 7. Section 8 contains empirical results and 
findings, while section 9 concludes.  
2 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
The Nordic environment is known for having a predictable political and 
macroeconomic climate. The politicians in the Nordic countries are known for 
keeping the promises made, and the legal and regulatory environment is considered 
friendly from the perspective of deal making3.  
Levels of announced mergers and acquisitions in the Nordic region have had an 
increasing trend since mid-90s.  Both number of acquisitions and value of transactions 
peaked close before the financial downfalls around 2000 and 2007, following the 
trends of the market. However, transaction value trends fell more heavily than number 
of acquisitions4, indicating that mergers and acquisitions remains a supported strategy.  
3 THEORY 
This section presents the basics of mergers and acquisitions, and provides an 
understanding of mechanisms in deal structuring. In addition, various valuation 
approaches will be introduced. 
3.1 Steps in an Acquisition 
According to Damodaran (2002), there are four steps in an acquisition. First, the 
acquirer has to develop a rationale and a strategy for doing the acquisition.  Second, it 
need choose a proper target that fulfils the requirements set out in that rationale. As 
part of this, the acquirer needs to do a valuation of the target firm. This valuation also 
includes estimates of the potential premiums that can be achieved through synergy 
effects. The next step is to decide how much to pay for the target, how to best raise 
these funds, and what form the compensation should take. The final step is to make 
the acquisition work after the deal is complete. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Information backed by a report about the Nordic mid-market M&A by Spencer (2007)  
4 Source: http://www.imaa-institute.org/statistics-mergers-acquisitions.html 
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 Developing an Acquisition Strategy 3.1.1
The development of an acquisition strategy is highly dependent on the underlying 
motive of the acquirer. Motives for doing an acquisition might be to reduce risk, 
create synergies, take advantage of poor management, or to gain surplus through 
mispriced targets (Damodaran, 2002).  
In order to reduce risk, a strategy that can be employed is diversification. It is 
an open discussion on whether this type of diversification is the responsibility of firms 
or investors. Investors have the opportunity to diversify across traded stocks, while the 
firm needs to acquire other firms to achieve the same effect. It is clear that transaction 
costs associated with diversification are less for investors than for firms, but 
exceptions exist. An example of this is where the owner of a private firm has the 
majority of his wealth invested in one firm. In such a situation, the owner is exposed 
to all the risk hence improving the argument for letting the firm do diversification.   
The second acquisition motive is synergy. Synergy is the additional value that 
can be obtained from combining two firms, and can be categorized into operating 
synergy and financial synergy.  
Operating synergy is the type of synergy that allows the combined firm to increase 
operating income, growth or both. Damodaran (2002) describes four sources of 
operating synergy. 
1. Economies of scale, which allow the combined firm to become more cost-
efficient and profitable. 
2. Greater pricing power, which through increased market share and less 
competition improves margins and operating income. 
3. Combination of different functional strengths; e.g., a highly skilled production 
company acquiring a skilled marketing firm.  
4. Higher growth in new or existing markets; e.g., acquisition of a firm that 
already has an established distribution network and brand recognition, which 
the acquirer can utilize to increase sales of its own products.  
Financial synergies are the type of synergy whose payoff can take the form of either 
higher cash flows or a lower cost of capital. Damodaran (2002) mentions the 
following sources. 
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• Combination of a firm with excess cash (and limited projects) and a firm with 
high-return projects (and limited cash). By combining the firms there exist a 
possibility to increase value by initiating positive NPV projects that otherwise 
would not have been possible. 
• Increased debt capacity, resulting from more stable and predictable cash flows. 
This permits the combined firm to borrow more than prior to the acquisition, 
ultimately resulting in a tax benefit. The tax benefit can be in the form of either 
higher cash flows or lower cost of capital.  
• Combining two firms can also yield tax benefits like for example using 
operating losses to shelter income, or by taking advantage of tax laws. 
Combination of firms can also result in an increase in depreciation charges 
lowering the tax base of the combined firm.  
There is great potential for achieving synergy effects through mergers. However, it 
can be challenging to fully show the effects when performing valuation of the target. 
The third mentioned motive is that acquirers often base their rationale on the 
belief that they can run the target firm better than its current managers. Acquiring 
poorly managed firms and changing either current management or policies and 
practices should increase the target firm value. This value increase is often referred to 
as value of control.  
Fourth, Firms that are undervalued by the financial markets can be subject to 
acquisition by those who identify this mispricing. The potential surplus that the 
acquirer can gain on these transactions is the difference between the value and the 
purchase price. 
 Choosing a Target Firm and Estimating the Value of Synergy 3.1.2
After establishing a motive and a corresponding strategy for the acquisition, the 
acquirer needs to find a target that fits within the profile. In general, the target has to 
be in line with the acquisition strategy. If the motive is to take advantage of 
undervalued firms; find targets which are mispriced by the capital market. If the 
motive is risk reduction through diversification; find targets which are uncorrelated 
with your own, etc.  
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Also, the bidder needs to perform a valuation of the target. When performing 
valuation from the perspective of potentially acquiring the firm, estimates of synergy 
and control premiums has to be added.  
 Structuring the Acquisition 3.1.3
The next step in the acquisition process is agreeing on how to structure the 
acquisition. According to Damodaran (2002), there are three interrelated steps in this 
phase.  
First, figure out how much to pay. Second, figure out how to pay, cash, stock or 
a combination of the two. Also, determine whether any of the funds needs to be 
borrowed. Third, decide on accounting treatment of the deal.   
3.2 Is a Deal Possible? 
When target and bidder are negotiating the deal, it is very likely that they have 
different perception of the risk associated with the target’s cash flow and hence use 
different discount rates in their valuation. This ultimately causes a situation where it 
appears that no deal can take place. However, there are possibilities of structuring the 
deal in ways that can help resolve these issues.  
 Risk Shifting Contract Structures 3.2.1
As mentioned above, two parties in a negotiation process are very often unaligned 
when it comes to perceived risk and profits. To minimize the gap, resolving 
mechanisms can be introduced. These include: postclosing price adjustments, 
contingent value rights and performance related structures like earnouts and staged 
payouts (DePamphilis, 2011). 
One of the more common mechanisms that are applied is escrow accounts and 
target balance sheet adjustment. Escrow accounts are when the buyer retains portions 
of the purchase price until a postclosing audit is performed. The escrow payment is 
done when the underlying agreement is accomplished, hence mitigating risk for the 
buyer. Balance sheet adjustments are normally used when the time between purchase 
price agreement and actual closing date is long. The purpose is to control for potential 
differences in balance sheet items, especially those related to working capital.  
Contingent  value rights, often referred to as CVRs, are commitments made by 
the acquirer to pay an extra share of cash or securities if the issued shares fall below a 
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pre-agreed share price at some future date. The CVRs can be considered put options 
that are limiting the downside loss for the target.  
Under distributed or staged payouts the purchase price is dependent on target 
managers’ ability to deliver pre-agreed milestones. Milestones can be everything from 
cash flow targets to patent approvals. These mechanisms serve two purposes: reducing 
risk by limiting uncertainty about future cash flows, and shifting risk to seller 
regarding its ability to deliver according to predictions.   
An earnout agreement is a deal type where a portion of the purchase price is 
contingent on a pre-agreed performance measure. This type of agreement is normally 
used when target and bidder cannot agree on forecast performance of the target’s 
business, or when the buyer wants to create incentives by inviting the seller to take 
part in the upside potential. To resolve the first mentioned, parts of the purchase price 
is made payable only if the target exceed a certain threshold. Payment terms can also 
be based on average performance over several periods, or periodic payments 
dependent on achievements of interim performance measures.  
Involving seller in the upside potential creates an incentive for the target to 
operate the target as efficiently as possible post acquisition. This can be achieved by 
offering a fixed multiple of the average annual performance of the target.  
Clearly, contract design is influenced by principal-agent conflicts. Earnouts are 
structured to provide seller management incentive to operate the business in the best 
interest of the buyer. However, long term effects might be different. To boost short 
term cash flow performance, target management may cut back on investments for 
future performance (e.g. training, investments in R&D, etc.). One can argue that the 
challenge can be resolved by introducing several performance measures, but this will 
complicate the contract and increase the likelihood of conflict. Rule of thumb is that 
earnouts should be easy to interpret, and leave no room for discussion.  
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3.3 Approaches to Valuation 
The second step presented by Damadoran requires the acquirer to perform valuation of 
the target. The value of any firm or resource equals the present value of expected 
future cash flows, discounted at a rate which reflects the risk associated with those 
future cash flows.  
𝑉0 = � 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑡(1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1   
(1) 
Valuation approaches that use information in accounting numbers, financial 
statements and related notes to estimate cash flows can be grouped into two 
categories: wealth distribution approaches and free cash flow realization approaches 
(Wahlen, Baginski & Bradshaw, 2008). 
The wealth distribution approach to valuation discounts the present value of 
expected future dividends over the lifespan the firm, including liquidating dividend. 
This is based on the assumption that value of common equity should equal the present 
value of the expected future dividends that the shareholder will receive.  
From a cash flow perspective, the value of a share of common equity should 
also be equal to present value of future free cash flows. Ultimately, these cash flows 
will be distributed to the common equity shareholders as dividends. This is called the 
free cash flow realization approach to valuation. To perform a valuation using this 
approach, one discounts the expected future free cash flows to present value. This is 
done over the life of the firm, including the final liquidating cash flows.  
Where the above processes mentioned uses future dividends or future free cash 
flows as the numerator in equation (1), the residual income valuation approach use 
book value of common shareholders’ equity and expected future earnings. 
Shareholders’ equity is a measure on common equity shareholders’ claim on the net 
assets of the firm, hence providing a valid starting point for valuation. Future earnings 
represent net profit or loss that will be generated for the shareholders, and is therefore 
a proper measure on total wealth to be created by the firm to the shareholders.  
Over sufficient time periods, cash flow distributable to shareholders will equal 
the shareholders’ capital invested in the firm plus the lifetime earnings of the firm 
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(Wahlen et al., 2008). These estimates will under this condition5 be equivalent to 
valuation using distributable cash flows. Note that the cash flow based valuation 
approach, as well as the residual income valuation approach is equivalent to the 
dividends approach.  
 Residual Income Valuation 3.3.1
The market is mainly seeking and acting on information relevant for equation (1). 
From the perspective of a residual income valuation approach, the information 
required to provide answers, common shareholders’ equity and earnings, needs 
subsequently to be available. Accounting for the book value of common shareholders 
equity’ is expressed as (Wahlen et al., 2008) 
 𝐵𝑉𝑡 = 𝐵𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝑁𝐼𝑡 − 𝐷𝑡 
 
where 𝐵𝑉𝑡 is the book value of the common shareholders’ equity at the end of year t, 
and 𝑁𝐼𝑡 is the net income of year t. This is considered valid under the assumption that 
accounting follows the clean surplus assumption. In practice, this means that net 
income includes all recognized elements of income for common equity shareholders, 
and dividends include all direct capital transactions between the common shareholders 
and the firm.  
Because of the relationship between dividends, net income and book value,6 
we can substitute the net income plus the change in book value of common 
shareholders’ equity into the dividend valuation model (Wahlen et al., 2008). By 
doing some algebraic and substitution, we obtain the residual income valuation model 
 
𝑉0=𝐵𝑉0 + � 𝑁𝐼𝑡 − (𝑅𝐸  ×  𝐵𝑉𝑡−1)(1 + 𝑅𝐸)𝑡∞𝑡=1  
(2) 
Here we have a model that is similar to the dividend valuation approach, fitted for 
information available in accounting figures. As described above, using account 
                                                 
5 Where “this condition” refers to“Over the life of the firm”. See Peter D. Easton, Trevor S. Harris, and 
James A. Ohlson, “Aggregate Accounting Earnings Can Explain Most of Security Returns,” Journal of 
Accounting and Economics (1992), pp. 119–142.  
6 Dividends equal net income plus the change in book value of common shareholders’ equity 
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available information provides valuation results equivalent with cash flow approaches. 
It is important to note that it is not possible to do precise estimates on the forecasted 
income statements and balance sheets for a long period into the future. The residual 
income valuation methodology accounts for this by first forecasting for a short period 
of time, and then adds a simplified and constant growth rate after the finite horizon. 
This introduces a third part to the valuation model: 
 
[��𝑁𝐼𝑡  ×  (1 + 𝑔)� − (𝑅𝐸  ×  𝐵𝑉𝑡)�  ×  1(𝑅𝐸 − 𝑔)  ×  1(1 + 𝑅𝐸)𝑇 ] 
 
By adding this term to the residual income valuation model in equation (2), we obtain 
a finite horizon residual income model as follows 
 
𝑉0=𝐵𝑉0 + � 𝑁𝐼𝑡 − (𝑅𝐸  ×  𝐵𝑉𝑡−1)(1 + 𝑅𝐸)𝑡∞𝑡=1 + [��𝑁𝐼𝑡  ×  (1 + 𝑔)� − (𝑅𝐸  ×  𝐵𝑉𝑡)�×  1(𝑅𝐸 − 𝑔)  ×  1(1 + 𝑅𝐸)𝑇 ] 
(3) 
This residual income valuation model calculates value of common equity based on 
three parts:  
• Book value of common equity at time t=0, 
• Present value of residual income over the forecast horizon through year T, and  
• Present value of continuing value. 
3.4 Accounting Considerations 
Both IFRS and U.S. GAAP permit a variety of items to pass through the income 
statement and to be reported directly in shareholders’ equity. Also, off-balance-sheet 
liabilities or nonoperating and nonrecurring items of income may obscure the 
performance of the firm. (Pinto, Henry, Robinson & Stowe, 2010). Together with 
potential violation of the clean surplus accounting assumption, this opens up potential 
pitfalls for the residual income valuation approach. This part will address the 
following accounting considerations for the residual income valuation approach (Pinto 
et al. 2010).  
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• Violations of the clean surplus accounting assumption 
• Balance sheet adjustments for fair value 
• Intangible assets 
• Nonrecurring items 
In addition, accounting considerations that have a direct effect on the earnout will be 
presented. 
 Violations of Clean Surplus Accounting Assumption 3.4.1
The residual income valuation approach requires the assumption of clean surplus 
accounting to hold. For IFRS, which is the applicable standard in Nordic countries, 
some changes in fair value estimates are allowed to bypass the income statement and 
hence directly have an effect on equity. From the perspective of the residual income 
valuation approach, the net income will then not be stated accurately. Using a forecast 
of net income that violates this assumption will result in distorted estimates of residual 
income, over both finite and infinite horizon. If the net present value of violations of 
clean surplus accounting is not set to zero, reductions in income from some period 
may be offsets by increased income in other periods. 
 Balance Sheet Adjustments for Fair Value 3.4.2
In order to have a trustworthy measure of common shareholders’ book value of equity, 
significant off-balance-sheet assets and liabilities needs investigating. These off-
balance-sheet items can affect assessments of both book values and net income. 
Examples may be inventory, deferred tax and liabilities, operating leases and 
intangible assets. Information about this, together with items that may be unique for 
the subject firm, is normally found in financial statements and footnotes.  
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 Intangible Assets 3.4.3
Under IFRS IAS 38 an intangible asset is an “identifiable non-monetary asset without 
physical substance”7. Often, these types of assets are not recognized until they are 
obtained in an acquisition8. Hence, they have an impact on reported book values and 
consequently the residual income valuation approach.  
Another important area that needs consideration is expenses related to R&D. 
Under IFRS, some costs related to R&D can be capitalized and amortized over time. 
These expenditures are reflected in the returns of the firm, and for this reason also in 
the residual income. If the firm has unproductive expenditures related to R&D, the 
residual income should be lower (expenditures made), and if the R&D expenditures 
are productive, the residual income should be higher (offset the expenditures made). 
In-process R&D can be recognized as an acquired finite-life intangible asset or as part 
of goodwill. 
 Nonrecurring Items 3.4.4
Firms have a tendency to report nonrecurring items as part of earnings or to classify 
non-operating income as part of operating income (e.g. sale of assets). This will have 
a consequence in terms of forecasting future residual income since the former is 
misleading. These types of misclassifications may lead to both under –and 
overestimates if no adjustments are made.  However, there is no need to do any 
adjustments to book value when it comes to these items because nonrecurring gains 
and losses are reflected in the value of assets in place. Regardless, these items should 
be removed from operating earnings if they are not likely to continue contributing to 
residual income.  
 Accounting Considerations for Earnouts 3.4.5
In 2008, the International Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB’s) and the U.S. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB’s) released new standards for 
business combinations and non-controlling interest. Differences between the two 
standards are minor. After the new release, business combinations are more likely to 
                                                 
7 IFRS Tehcnical summary of IAS 38: 
http://www.ifrs.org/IFRSs/Documents/English%20IAS%20and%20IFRS%20PDFs%202012/IAS%203
8.pdf 
8 However, if the subject firm have been part of an acquisition prior to the valuation, it is very likely 
that the intangible assets are recognized. 
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have an immediate impact on reported profits, whereof contingent considerations (e.g. 
earnouts) are very much affected.  
Under the new standards, contingent considerations have to be recognized at fair 
value at the time of acquisition. This obligation is classified as either a liability or 
equity, based on the definition in applicable standard9. Further, all subsequent 
changes in fair value estimates have to be recorded in P&L accounts hence affecting 
reported earnings. This will finally have an impact on the residual income, and 
therefore needs to be adjusted for.  
 
4 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section provides an overview of the existing literature on the subject. It covers 
deal structuring and earnout studies as well as consequences of M&A.  
4.1 Deal structuring and Earnout Studies 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) have studied the choice of payment method in European 
mergers and acquisition for the period of 1997 to 2000. The data sample contains 
3,667 transactions, and of those are 80% pure cash deals and 11.3% pure stock 
deals10. 
 Earnout Characteristics 4.1.1
In terms of earnouts, Kohers and Ang (2000) provide evidence that they serve as a 
mechanism against misevaluation in cases with high levels of asymmetric 
information. Kohers and Ang also provide evidence that the earnout serves a purpose 
of retaining target firm management. Together we can then say that the earnout serves 
as a risk-hedging mechanism against high information asymmetry and as a retention 
bonus for securing valuable human capital.  
The authors report that earnout structured transactions tend to involve private 
targets in high technology industries. Targets within this industry contributed for 
21.7% of the earnouts in their sample. They also find that the majority of earnouts is 
between targets and bidders from different industries. Cross-industry takeovers 
accounted for 68.44% of the earnouts in the sample. All findings correspond to the 
                                                 
9 IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation and relevant U.S. GAAP (e.g., FAS 133 Accounting for 
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, EITF 00-19 Accounting for Derivative Financial 
Instruments Indexed to, and Potentially Settled in, a Company’s Own Stock, and FAS 150 Accounting 
for Certain Financial Instruments with Characteristics of both Liabilities and Equity) 
10 The remainder is either a combination or debt assumed. 
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ones of Datar et al. (2001). Datar et al (201) also contributes to the subject by 
providing evidence that choosing earnouts is closely linked to the lack of availability 
of comparable targets which are already priced.  
The results of Kohers and Ang show that on average, the target that is under an 
earnout receive an estimated 62% of the total earnout amount, and full payment was 
made in about 46% of the cases.  
 Determinants of Earnout Terms 4.1.2
Cain, Denis and Denis (2006) extended on previous earnout studies by focusing on the 
impacts caused by 
• Size of the earnout consideration 
• Performance measure that the earnout payment was based upon 
• Interval on which the performance was measured, and 
• The form of the earnout payment 
They find that greater uncertainty of target value is associated with larger earnouts, 
shorter earnout periods, the use of sales as performance measure and common stock as 
the form of payment. Also, high-growth opportunities with the target firm indicate 
larger earnouts, longer measurement periods and use of stock as payment. When the 
target operates in another industry than the bidder, they find that it is more likely to 
use income as performance measure.  
Further, the authors succeed in providing evidence on systematic interactions 
among the contract terms. Earnout size is positively linked to the length of the earnout 
period and measurement interval, and stock as payment method.  
Also, Caselli et al. (2006) states that the performance measure which payment 
of an earnout is tied to is usually revenue, EBITDA or net income.  
 The Role of EBITDA Growth in Mergers 4.1.3
In line with the findings of Caselli et al. (2006), EBITDA is reported to have value 
relevance in the period close to the acquisition. Results of a study performed by 
Christian and Jones (2004) suggest that EBITDA plays a value-relevant role beyond 
earnings in the year of the merger. These findings suggest that earnings may not be a 
sufficient performance measure of the combined firm’s value during that year. 
EBITDA is reported as the most value relevant measure in the year of the acquisition, 
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compensating for the lack of relevance for earnings. However, a significant change is 
reported from the merger year to the year after. This applies both for earnings 
(positive change, significant at 0.05 level), and EBITDA (negative change, significant 
at 0.10 level).  
4.2 Post-Acquisition Valuation Studies 
Robert F. Bruner (2001) summarizes the evidence from 14 informal studies and 100 
scientific studies conducted between 1971 and 2001. In addition to reporting findings, 
Bruner reviews and comments the various research approaches that were employed.  
Regarding the profitability of M&A, Bruner reports that 1/3 of the research report 
value destruction, 1/3 show value conservation and 1/3 value creation.  
Bruner split the previous research into four categories: Event studies, 
accounting studies, clinical studies and surveys of executives. Event studies are 
examinations of abnormal returns to shareholders in the period around transaction 
announcement. Accounting studies compares pre –and post-acquisition reported 
results and examines whether performance has changed. Clinical studies are deep 
diving into one or a few transactions to induce new insights. And down the more 
subjective road, we have surveys of executives which report answers of executives on 
whether acquisitions created value.   
When looking at the approaches’ fit for hypotheses testing, event studies and 
accounting studies are the proper candidates. Clinical research and surveys aim to 
describe rather than test. Bruner also reports that the key test used in event and 
accounting studies is the t-test.  
 Accounting Studies 4.2.1
In a paper published in 2010, Guest, Bild and Runsten examined the financial impact 
of 303 UK acquisitions using both an event study approach and two types of 
accounting study approaches.   
First, the authors describe an accounting approach. This implies comparing 
post-acquisition profitability of the acquirer with a weighted average of the acquirer 
and acquiree, and is in line with the wealth distribution approach mentioned in section 
3. The key measure of profitability is in this case return on equity (ROE). ROE consist 
of net income, scaled by the opening book value of equity. The relevant means used to 
describe pre –and post-acquisition profitability is ROE year t-1 to t-3 and ROE year 
t+1 to t+3, respectively. The results are compared to control firms to assess abnormal 
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returns, which represent the consequence of acquisition. However, this approach does 
not take into account changes in risk. The authors report a significant 2.62% 
improvement in ROE stemming from takeovers. 
As an alternative to the basic accounting approach described above, the 
authors introduce a new methodology which adopts a residual income valuation 
approach. They adopt the model introduced in section 3.3.1 to measure the impact of 
acquisition on what they define as fundamental values of acquirers. Based on this, 
they calculate the realized fundamental value of the acquirer based on post-acquisition 
results. This result is then compared with expected fundamental value of the acquirer 
prior to the acquisition, estimated from previously reported results. Total fundamental 
value consists of book value of equity, dividends, residual income in year t+1 and t+2 
and a third term representing terminal value. The authors report a significant increase 
of 20.14% in total fundamental value for acquirers. However, when controlling for the 
results of the control firms, the change in fundamental value become negative, but 
insignificant. The authors conclude that acquisitions have an insignificant effect on the 
fundamental value of acquirers.   
 Event Studies 4.2.2
When performing valuation by share return methodologies, the authors introduce two 
measures: First, an estimate of buy-and-hold returns is being applied. Second, they use 
an average cross-sectional abnormal return using a calendar time portfolio technique. 
Both measures are estimated for both the announcement month, consistent with the 
approach presented by Bruner, and for the 36-month post-acquisition period following 
completion.  
The buy-and-hold approach is done by first estimating the buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns and then calculating cross-sectional dependence adjusted t-statistics. 
The authors report that buy-and-hold abnormal returns of -1.72% over the 
announcement month, while over the 36-month period they report -15.61%, both 
significant at one percent. Thus, acquirer’s share returns are negative following an 
acquisition.  
The calendar time portfolio technique involves forming a portfolio of event 
firms for each calendar month and taking the average cross-sectional abnormal returns 
for the specific month.  Using this approach, the authors report an average monthly 
abnormal return of -0.45%, also significant at one percent. Hence, the authors 
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conclude that acquisitions have a significant negative effect on the share return of 
acquirers. 
Comparing the conclusions of accounting and event studies, they conclude that 
the argument that negative share returns can be explained by the stock market’s 
reaction on acquisition on acquirers’ fundamental value can be refuted.  
 Value of Synergy 4.2.3
As introduced in section 3, value of synergy is part of the valuation of an acquisition. 
In a paper published in 2005, Aswath Damodaran examines how much synergy is 
actually created in corporate mergers. According to Damadoran, existence of synergy 
can be evaluated from two perspectives. First, he evaluates on a forward looking basis. 
This explains how the market reacts to announcements, gauging what is the expected 
synergy value and who is achieving it. The second is to track pre-merger development 
and evaluate the success of delivering the synergy gains.  
Looking at the first, Damadoran refers to a study made by Bradley, Desai and 
Kim (1988) where 236 inter-firms tender offers were examined. They reported that 
value of the target and bidder increased by 7.48% on average on the announcement of 
the merger.  
On the second perspective, it is being referred to studies which are evaluating 
the performance of the merger firms relative to their competitors in the time following 
the takeover. Damodaran refers amongst other to a study done by McKinsey and Co. 
where they examined 58 acquisition programs between 1978 and 1983. The study 
looked for evidence on whether acquirer’s return on investment exceeded cost of 
capital, and whether the acquisition supported the acquirer in outperforming its 
competitors. They concluded that 28 of the 58 programs failed to provide evidence on 
both, and additional 6 failed at least one. He also mentions that McKinsey and Co. 
performed a follow-up study for the 1990s in the U.K. and U.S., providing evidence 
that only 23% earned excess returns, and as many as 60% of the transactions failed to 
earn returns according to their cost of capital.  
He concludes that synergy effects is seldom achieved in acquisitions, mainly 
due to misevaluation, bad planning and because it is much more difficult to create in 
practice than on paper.  
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4.3 Accounting Considerations 
Cadman, Carrizosa and Faurel (2012) provide some interesting evidence on fair value 
adjustments related to earnouts. By examining a sample of 1,114 quarterly earnout fair 
value adjustments, derived from 262 acquisitions, they found that average increase in 
earnout fair value is $2.6 million, while the corresponding decrease was $4.7 million. 
Given the increased availability of information11, they examine the capital market’s 
reactions to these adjustments. They report that large upward earnout fair value 
adjustments are positively responded to by the market, even after controlling for the 
direct effect that the adjustments had on earnings. Interestingly, they do not find 
evidence on the same relationship with downward adjustments. This implies that the 
market reacts favorably to positive news on the earnout, despite of the negative effect 
it has on reported earnings.  
5 HYPOTHESES 
With background in the theory presented in section 3 and previous research in section 
4, the main question that needs to be answered is 
 
Why do firms use earnouts?  
 
The goal of the testing is to provide an answer on whether acquirers use earnouts 
rationally, and if they achieve the expected results. When acquirers use earnouts, do 
we see an increase in the most used performance measures? And do acquirers 
experience any cash flow consequences that can be related to the earnout?  
Based on the information provided through section three and four, we formulate 
and test the following hypotheses related to fundamental value12, EBITDA margin and 
revenue.  
  
                                                 
11 Earnout fair value adjustments provide participants in the capital market with valuable information 
that they can incorporate in their valuations of the acquiring firm.  
12 Under the definition of Guest, Bild and Runsten (2010), where fundamental value is the result of a 
valuation using the residual income valuation approach. 
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5.1 Fundamental Value 
• H1: Acquirers using an earnout experience positive change in fundamental 
value compared to non-earnouts.  
Summarized by Bruner (2002), it is problematic to find clear patters in terms of 
returns to the buyer firm. One potential reason for not being able to report positive 
return on investment is that the initial investment is too high. As a method for 
resolving differences in valuation estimates between target and bidder, the earnout 
provision is introduced. Based on this, and under the assumption that the earnout 
actually do resolve this challenge, it is expected to see a positive change in 
fundamental value of the acquirer following the acquisition. This measure will also 
capture the potential effect of net income, which according to Caselli et al. (2006) is 
one of the main performance figures linked to earnout payment.  
5.2 Revenue Growth 
• H2: Acquirers using an earnout experience higher growth in revenue 
compared to non-earnouts.  
As introduced in section 4, Cain, Denis and Denis (2012) suggest that greater 
uncertainty is linked to using the top line as performance measure. Based on these 
findings, revenue is an appropriate measure of success for the earnout. This measure is 
also in line with the statement of Caselli et al. (2006). If an earnout is successful, the 
expectation would be to observe an increase in revenue from the year prior to the 
acquisition to the years where it is likely that the earnout is active. This increase is 
expected to be stronger than for those who are not using an earnout.  
5.3 EBITDA Margin 
• H3: Acquirers using an earnout experience higher growth in EBITDA margin 
compared to non-earnouts 
According to Christian and Jones (2004), EBITDA plays a compensating role for 
earnings in the year of the acquisition. In addition, Caselli et al. (2006) reports 
EBITDA as one of the main figures tied to the earnout contract. If the acquirer using 
an earnout has been successful, we should find a strengthening of the EBITDA margin 
from the year prior to the acquisition to the three years where it is likely that the 
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earnout is active. This strengthening is expected to be stronger than for those who are 
not using an earnout.  
6 METHODOLOGY 
This section will present the methods used for testing the hypotheses. To illustrate, the 
acquisition of Papelera Peninsular SA by Holmen AB will be used throughout the 
section.  
6.1 Time Periods 
The data used in the study has been gathered for a total of 7 periods. This includes 
three years prior to the acquisition, the year where the transaction took place, and 
three years after the acquisition. The reason for collecting historical data as far as 
three years back in time as that some of the forecasts estimates done in the valuation is 
based on an average calculated from year t-3 to t-1.  The year of acquisition is defined 
as year t=0. An earnout period is often three years13 and in order increase the 
likelihood that the measured effects is related to the earnout, not the acquisition itself, 
the period of measurement is three years.  
6.2 Cost of Equity 
The cost of equity is calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). It is 
being calculated on a firm specific basis, both for firms in the sample and in the peer 
groups. The individual firms’ beta values are calculated by Datastream, and requires 
minimum two and a half year of data. The risk premiums for Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland are assumed at respectively 5.8%, 5.9%, 5.5% and 6.0%14. The 
risk free rate is obtained using year average rates of the respective countries’ 10 year 
government bonds. According to a report issued by PricewaterhouseCoopers in 
201315, 10-year government bonds is the most common measurement for risk free 
rate, even after the financial crisis.  
In the residual income valuation method, year t-1 cost of equity is used when 
doing pre-acquisition valuation, while the mean cost of equity in years t+1 to t+3 is 
being used for post-acquisition calculations. 
                                                 
13 Talking to experienced professionals. The means the period where it exist potential payments based 
on pre-agreed figures.  
14 According to a survey with 7192 responses by Fernandez, P., Aguirreamalloa, J., Avendaño in 2013.  
15 The Norwegian Market Risk Premium 2012 and 2013 (n.d.) 
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6.3 Residual Income Valuation Approach 
Following the definition of Guest, Bild and Runsten (2010), fundamental value is 
expressed through the residual income valuation approach. The approach in this thesis 
will employ the same principles. 
Based on equation (3), presented in section 3.3.1, the expression for 
fundamental value is obtained. However, in the model applied here, it is assumed no 
growth in book value of equity after the last year within finite horizon. Fundamental 
value in this case is then defined as the sum of book value and present value of future 
residual income.   
𝑉𝑡=𝐵𝑉𝑡 + � 𝐸𝑡�𝑁𝐼𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑟𝑒 × 𝐵𝑡+𝑖−1�(1 + 𝑅𝐸)𝑡∞𝑡=1 + 𝐸𝑡+𝑇 �𝑁𝐼𝑡+𝑇 − 𝑟𝑒 × 𝐵𝑡+𝑇 −1�(1 + 𝑟𝑒)𝑡+𝑇 −1𝑟𝑒  
(4) 
Calculating the infinite horizon estimates as terminal value, reflected in part three of 
the equation. 
6.4 Estimation Procedure for Fundamental Value 
As the purpose of the thesis is to compare the difference in the change in fundamental 
value effects of acquisitions when using different contract structures, a natural place to 
start is by establishing a procedure on how to measure pre- and post-acquisition 
fundamental value of the acquirer.  
For pre-acquisition valuation, future net income is forecasted with basis in the 
acquirer’s average net income in years t-3 to t-1. This is in line with previous takeover 
profitability studies conducted with applications of the RIV model (e.g. Guest, Bild 
and Runsten (2010)). In this model, the forecasts are done directly on net income and 
common shareholders’ equity. In previous applications, these estimates are done on 
average return on equity with goal of estimating future earnings-per-share. However, 
since issuing shares is an often-used method of payment16 the results in this thesis also 
need to be adjusted to a per-share basis. After this is done, the difference in approach 
has no net effect.  
                                                 
16 As mentioned earlier the dataset of Faccio and Masulis (2005) consisted of 11.3% pure-stock deals. 
Issuing share will result in an increase of total fundamental value, but a decrease in fundamental value 
per share.  
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The value of shareholders’ equity is forecasted by adding net profit minus the 
expected dividends in year t=0 to the book value in year t-1. The estimated dividend 
payout ratios are the average dividend payout in years t-3 to t-1. In other words, the 
book value of year t=0 is estimated by adding expected net income to the previously 
valued equity, and then subtracting expected dividends in year t=0. For year t+1, net 
income is forecasted before subtracting expected dividends for year t+1. The same 
applies for the remaining years. 
  The model also needs to be secured against potential violations of clean 
surplus accounting. By replacing book value from year t-1 and residual income in year 
t=0 with book value and dividends in year t=0 the dirty surplus effects in the 
estimates are avoided. Now, in year t=0 the effect has already happened. Now, any 
change in future residual income caused by book value is now an only an offset of the 
year t=0 value.  
 
Based on this estimation procedure, we can now establish an equation to determine 
pre-acquisition fundamental value: 
 
𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑒 = 𝐸−1(𝐷0)(1 + 𝑟𝑒) +
𝐸−1(𝐵𝑉0)(1 + 𝑟𝑒) + 𝐸−1(𝑁𝐼1 − 𝑟𝑒 × 𝐵𝑉0)(1 + 𝑟𝑒)2 + 𝐸−1(𝑁𝐼2 − 𝑟𝑒 × 𝐵𝑉1)(1 + 𝑟𝑒)3 + 𝐸−1(𝑁𝐼3 − 𝑟𝑒 × 𝐵𝑉2)(1 + 𝑟𝑒)3𝑟𝑒  
(5) 
where the two first terms are dividends and book value of equity in the year of the 
acquisition, and the last three terms are the estimated fundamental value in the 
respective years. The estimates are done under the assumption that the acquisition is 
not yet known.  
For the post-acquisition fundamental value, the same principles are applied but 
using realised fundamental value instead of estimated fundamental value.  
 
𝑉𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡= 𝐷0(1 + 𝑟𝑒) +
𝐵𝑉0(1 + 𝑟𝑒) + 𝑁𝐼1 − 𝑟𝑒 × 𝐵𝑉0(1 + 𝑟𝑒)2 + 𝑁𝐼2 − 𝑟𝑒 × 𝐵𝑉1(1 + 𝑟𝑒)3 + 𝑁𝐼3 − 𝑟𝑒 × 𝐵𝑉2(1 + 𝑟𝑒)3𝑟𝑒  
(6) 
To measure the acquisitions’ impact on fundamental value, pre-acquisition 
fundamental value is subtracted from post-acquisition fundamental value.  Positive 
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results indicate that fundamental value has been created. In order to make the results 
comparable across firms, the changes are measured in percentages according to 
equation (7), and control firm adjusted results are calculated according to equation 
(8)17. The reported results are means with outliers removed. 
 
�(𝑉𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑒)𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑒 �
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 
(7) 
��𝑉𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑒�𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑒 �
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 − ��𝑉𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑒�𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑒 �
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚
 
(8) 
 Example 6.4.1
In year 2000, Holmen AB, a Swedish firm in the forestry and paper sector acquired 
Papelera Peninsular SA, a Spanish firm within the same industry. The deal value was 
total EUR 244 million, and was a combination of cash and debt assumed. There was 
no contingent consideration (i.e. earnout) connected with the purchase, and the 
process of integration started immediately. The relevant financial information for 
years t-3 to t+3 relative to the year of the acquisition are presented in Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1 
Holmen AB financials  
Reports financials for Holmen AB both before and after the acquisition of Papalera Peninsular SA. All, 
that is EBITDA, net income, shareholders’ equity and dividends, are reported in thousands.  
              
Year EBITDA 
Net 
income 
Shareholders' 
equity 
Dividends No of shares Payout ratio 
1997 3391 1434 14345 732 66236 0,51 
1998 3981 2504 15896 777 66236 0,31 
1999 3598 1814 16825 3661 66236 2,02 
2000 5403 3972 15749 969 66236 0,24 
2001 3234 2186 15191 4927 57349 2,25 
2002 3143 1959 11003 645 57349 0,33 
2003 3029 1451 13024 756 57349 0,52 
                                                 
17 An explanation on the control groups are composed and calculated follows later in the thesis. 
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Following the estimation procedure described earlier, step one is to forecast future net 
income. The forecast net income in year t=0 equals the average net income in years t-
3 to t-1. For Holmen AB, this is 
 1434 + 2504 + 18143 = 1 917 
 
The same procedure is followed for years t+1 to t+3.  
Step two is to forecast dividends. This is done by multiplying net income in 
year t-1 by an average of the payout ratio18 in years 1 to 3. For Holmen AB, t=0 
forecast dividends are 
 
1814 × �0.51 + 0.31 + 2.023 � = 1 717 
 
This is done for years t+1 to t+3.  
The last forecast needed is shareholders’ equity. The book value in year t=0 is 
estimated by adding the expected net income to the previously valued equity, minus 
expected dividends in year t=0. For year t+1, the forecasted net income is added and 
expected dividends for year t+1 subtracted. The same applies for years t+2 and t+3. 
Forecasted common shareholders’ equity in year t=0 is 
16 825 + (1 917 − 1 717) = 17 026 
A summary of the forecasts on Holmen AB are presented in Table 2.  
 
  
                                                 
18 The payout ratio is calculated by dividing the dividends paid by net income.  
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TABLE 2 
Holmen AB Forecast summary 
A summary of the forecasts done on net income, dividends and shareholders equity’ All forecasts 
follow the procedures introduced in section 6.5. 
        
Year (E) Net income (E) Dividends (E)Shareholders equity 
2004 1917,33 1716,79 17026 
2005 2078,44 2060,44 17044 
2006 1936,59 2705,51 16275 
2007 1977,46 2119,79 16132 
 
We can now estimate pre- and post-acquisition fundamental value according to 
equation (5) and (6). The estimation procedure and corresponding results are 
presented in Table 3.  
 
 
TABLE 3 
Holmen AB: Fundamental value 
Panel A report the estimations on each component forming total fundamental value. The calculations 
are according to equation (5). Panel B report post-acquisition results according to equation (6).  
   
Description Calculation Value per share 
Panel A: Pre-acquisition fundamental value 
Dividends 17167891 + 0.089 66236�  23.8 
Book value of equity 170256691 + 0.089 66236�  236.03 
Residual income year 3 
2078444 − 0.089 × 17025669)(1 + 0.089)2 57349�  8.27 
Residual income year 2 
1936593 − (0.089 × 17043675)(1 + 0.089)3 57349�  5.66 
Terminal value 
1977457 − (0.089 × 16274758)(1 + 0.089)30.089 57349�  80.13 
Fundamental value per share SUM 353.89 
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
Description Calculation Value per share 
Panel B: Post-acquisition fundamental value 
Dividends 968783(1 + 0.089) 66236�  13.43 
Book value of equity 15749421(1 + 0.089) 66236�  218.3 
Residual income year 3 
2186000 − (0.089 × 15749421)(1 + 0.089)2 57349�  11.48 
Residual income year 2 
1959000 − (0.089 × 1519497)(1 + 0.089)3 57349�  8.15 
Terminal value 
1451000 − (0.089 × 11003106)(1 + 0.089)30.089 57349�  71.03 
Fundamental value per share SUM 322.40 
 
The total estimated fundamental value per share of Holmen AB prior to the 
acquisition is 353.89 against realised 322.40. Holmen AB has experienced a negative 
change in fundamental value of -8.9%.  
6.5 Controlling for Acquisitions 
Control firm groups are created for the acquirer using firms that falls within the same 
Datastream sector as the acquirer. The control measures are means of control group 
firm’s results, calculated following the same procedure as of the firms in the main 
sample. Outliers are removed from the control groups. Abnormal results are obtained 
when the mean results of the control groups are subtracted from the results of the 
acquirer.  
 Example (continued) 6.5.1
The results gained up to now is limited to measuring the general development of 
Holmen AB. In order to be able to link the effects to the acquisition made, a 
comparison with industry peers have to be done. This is meant to be a comparison of 
how they would have performed in the absence of acquisition. Holmen AB falls in 
under the Forestry and Paper classification in Datastream. In gathering firms for the 
control group the same time and geographical criteria as for the acquirers in the main 
sample are used. When excluding the firms that had been involved in a transaction 
during the time period, either as bidder or target, it remains three qualified comparable 
firms. These are subject to calculations according to equations (7) (9) (10) and (10). 
Results are summarized in Table 4.  
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TABLE 4 
Holmen AB: Forestry and paper control firms 
All values are reported on a per-share basis to secure comparability and to adjust for effects on 
fundamental value introduced by issuance of shares. In Panel B, changes in revenue and EBITDA 
margin are percentage change from the last fiscal year prior to the acquisition to a mean value of years 
t+1 to t+3. Panel C report averages of the changes reported in Panel B.  
              
  Fundamental value Revenue EBITDA margin 
Panel A: Pre- and post-
values             
  Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Metsa Board -2,7 15,09 4235600 6510533 16,90 % 12,80 % 
Rottneros 2,47 -2,09 2101000 2538333 10,30 % 10,00 % 
Bergs timber 19,47 -18,7 191283 269900 0,026 3,50 % 
              
Panel B: Change in values             
Metsa Board -118,00 % 54 % -4,10 % 
Rottneros -25,99 % 21 % -0,30 % 
Bergs timber 215,71 % 41 % 1 % 
              
Panel C: Averages             
Control variable values^a 24 % 39 % -1 % 
a^in later analysis, means will be calculated for each component (book value, residual income year 1 
and 2 and terminal value)  
 
6.6 Measuring Changes in Variables 
To measure the change in variables we measure both gross change and adjusted 
change. The change is being measured up to three years post-acquisition and 
compared to the last fiscal year before the acquisition. Gross change are being 
measured according to equation (8), suitable for comparing across firms. Control firm 
adjusted changes are being measured by a difference in differences approach 
according to equation (9). The reported results are means, with outliers removed. 
 𝑋𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑋𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑋𝑝𝑟𝑒  
(9) 
�𝑋𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑋𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑋𝑝𝑟𝑒 �
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 − �𝑋𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑋𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑋𝑝𝑟𝑒 �
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 
(10) 
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In equations (8) and (9), 𝑋𝑝𝑟𝑒 represent the measure in the last fiscal year prior to the 
acquisition, while 𝑋𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 is an average of year t+1 to t+3. However, the results will 
also be presented with annual changes in order to measure trends. In addition, yearly 
margins will be reported, based on the findings of Christian and Jones (2004) that 
EBITDA is complementary to earnings in the time around the time of acquisition.  
 Example (continued) 6.6.1
Moving on with the example with Holmen AB, we need to measure the changes 
observed in revenue and EBITDA margin. According to equation (9), changes in 
revenue and EBITDA margin is measured as 
 
�16184000𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 20508000𝑝𝑟𝑒20508000𝑝𝑟𝑒 �
𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝐴𝐵 = −0.021 
and 
�0.194𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 0.175𝑝𝑟𝑒 =�𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝐴𝐵 = 0.019 
 
where the results indicate that there has been a negative development in revenue but 
an increase in EBITDA margin.  
The industry adjusted changes are measured according to equation (10), and 
represent the change which can be linked to the acquisition: 
 
(−0.21)𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 − (0.43)𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 = −0.64 
 (0.019)𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 − (−0.01)𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 = 0.009 
 
We observe that the acquisition act as an amplifier of the already measured trend.  
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6.7 Measuring Differences Between Earnout and Non-Earnout Structures  
To measure the difference between acquirers using an earnout and those who do not, 
we compare the mean results of the two groups according to equation (11) and (12) 
 
�𝑋𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑋𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑋𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑠�
𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠 − �𝑋𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑋𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑋𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑠�
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠
 
(11) 
�𝑋𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑋𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑋𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙�
𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠 − �𝑋𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑋𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑋𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙�
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠 
(12) 
A transaction is considered an earnout if part of the payment is made contingent. On 
the other side, a transaction is non-earnout if full payment has occurred at the time of 
the acquisition.   
6.8 Statistical Significance 
To test the results for statistical significance, Student’s t-test for both paired an 
unpaired samples are being applied. This test is testing differences in means, and is 
hence telling us whether the observations prior to the acquisition are statistically 
different from the observations post acquisition.  
One could argue that due to the relatively small dataset, the measurements 
should be on the median, hence using the Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test or similar to 
test for statistical significance. However, Bruner (2002) suggest that the t-test is the 
most appropriate test for this type of approach. Anyhow, the data sample is relatively 
small, large deviations from the mean (outliers) will greatly affect the results. Hence, 
outliers are removed from both the sample and control groups. The determination of 
outliers is based on the inner and outer limit rule. The outer limit is defined as quartile 
1 minus 1.5 times the interquartile range. The lower limit is quartile 3 plus 1.5 times 
the interquartile range. If an observation falls without these ranges, it is defined as an 
outlier.  
The paired samples are calculations on differences in time according to equations (7)  
(8) (9) and (10). The unpaired samples are the measurements of differences between 
earnout and non-earnout transaction structures according to equations (11) and (12).  
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7 DATA 
Data is collected for the period 2000 to 2009 and include acquisitions done from 
Nordic countries. In order to fall under the definition of being a Nordic acquisition the 
bidder firm has to be either from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland or Iceland. The 
majority of the acquisitions that are subject for analysis in this study are conducted 
before the introduction of the new standards set out in U.S. GAAP and IFRS19.  
7.1 Data Collection 
The list of acquisitions has been extracted from the Zephyr, a database of deal 
information. It is required that the current status of the deal is ‘Complete’, and that the 
deal value is equal to or above EUR 10 million.  Only acquisitions where the bidder 
gains 100% ownership after the acquisition have been included in the sample. This 
includes acquisitions where the bidder firm already had up to 50% control in the 
target. If the pre-bid ownership is equal to or above 50%, it is omitted from the 
sample.  All acquisitions of assets are also removed from the sample, as it makes less 
sense to include an earnout in these types of contracts. In addition, all PE firms are 
removed since they are acquiring with a different rationale and basis than industrial 
firms. It is also required that each acquirer have a representable group of control firms. 
Acquirers which are divisions in a group are also removed20. Further, it is required 
that financial information21 is available from year t-3 to t+3.  
In order to be able to link the potential increase or decrease in the variables to 
the effect of the transaction, all firms which are involved in another transaction 
between year t-3 and t+3 are removed from the sample. In addition, all acquirers 
which did not have available financial information (e.g. firm not established) at least 3 
years prior to the transaction are removed. The same applies for firms without 
financial information in years t+1 to t+3. Acquirers which go bankrupt or are 
acquired by another firm within three years after the transaction are also removed. 
This leaves a sample of 33 transactions, whose time distribution is summarized in 
Table 5. 
                                                 
19 The standards were effective in respectively 2009 for IFRS and 2008 for U.S. GAAP. As the 
transactions in this study are made from Nordic firms, all fall in under IFRS. In the sample, 5 
transactions were done in 2008, and none in 2009.  
20 TTS Marine was removed from the sample because they are a division in the TTS Group. Hence, 
representative financial information is not easily available.  
21 Net income, shareholders’ equity, dividends, number of shares, EBITDA and revenue 
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TABLE 5   
Time distribution of completed deals in the Nordic countries between 2000 and 2009   
   
Date of 
transaction                       
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 N 
Firms in 
sample^a 5 7 3 2 3 4 2 2 5 0 
3
3 
a^ Firms in sample include all transactions which fulfil the criteria listed, and for which the required 
pre- and post-data is obtained for respectively -3 and +3 years from the year of the transaction   
 
7.2 Control Data 
To get an indication on what the situation would have been if the acquirer didn’t 
perform the acquisition, control groups are created for comparison. Requirements are 
that firms in the control group need to be within the same sector as the acquirer, as 
reported by Datastream. The same conditions as described in section 7.1 apply. 
However, the firms in the control group cannot have been part of a deal during the 
data period. This is determined by searching the Zephyr database. Maximum five 
firms are allowed in a control group, but actual number of firms range from one to 
five.  
7.3 Summary Statistics 
A summary of the characteristics of the acquisitions included in the sample is 
presented in Table 6. In the variables that is subject for tests we can see a large 
difference in size (ranges from min to max). This indicates that there might be many 
outliers in the sample that need to be removed in order to keep the integrity of the 
data.  
TABLE 6 
Summary statistics 
net income, shareholders equity and EBITDA for the sample firms the last fiscal year before 
acquisition. All numbers reported in thousands. 
 
Variable_direct 
  
Max Min Median Mean Std. Dev N 
  Net income 
  
10880 -60 498 1680 2764 33 
  Shareholders' equity 
  
71227 21 4134 13540 18496 33 
  EBITDA 
  
37736 -51 1849 6637 10477 33 
  Common dividends 
  
3865 0 97 759 1081 33 
  Revenue 
  
152835 25 6913 22712 35887 33 
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Table 7 is presenting the characteristics of the deals included in the sample. Cash is 
the dominant method of payment in the sample, with a few transactions being 
financed with shares22. This is close to the characteristics reported by Faccio and 
Masulis (2005)23.  
 
TABLE 7 
Method of payment for the acquisitions in the thesis sample 
This table report the method of payment as reported by Zephyr database. The method of payment is 
determined by the dominant compensation format. This means that some of the transactions that are 
classified as either cash, shares or debt assumed financed may actually be a combination. Average deal 
size is calculated from the reported deal sizes of Zephyr. 
 
% of acquisitions made with               
      Cash  69.7           
      Shares  18.2           
      Debt assumed  12.1           
% of acquisitions made with   
 
          
      Normal contract   78.8           
      Earnout contract   21.2           
Average deal size (th. EUR)   
  
750 976   
 
  
 
8 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In this section, empirical findings and test results will be presented for each of the 
hypotheses presented in section 5. Results will be presented together with the 
probability associated with the t-test. The findings are categorized according to section 
5: 
• Fundamental value 
• Revenue growth 
• EBITDA margin  
Findings are presented as significant at ten, five and one percent levels.  
  
                                                 
22 The definition follows what the Zephyr database classifies as the main source of compensation. In 
many of the cases, a various combinations of the three have been used. 
23 They reported that 80% of the deals were pure cash deals, and 11.3% pure stock. The results in this 
thesis are that 70% cash, and 18% stock, under the definition described in footnote 17.  
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8.1 H1: Fundamental Value Results 
Table 8 reports the results achieved when following the residual income valuation 
approaches described in earlier sections. The results presented are the ones of 
equations (4) to (8), together with its individual components. Panel A report pre-
acquisition values from equation (5) and abnormal values using equation (8). Panel B 
reports post-acquisition values according to equation (6). The values in Panel A and B 
are normalised by the pre-acquisition value by dividing each variable by the total pre-
acquisition value and multiplying with 100. This sets the total value to 100 for both 
the acquirer and control firm in Panel A Thus, changes are reported as percentage 
change. The components’24 values are reported as proportions of total value.  Panel D 
and E is showing the same type of values as Panel C for firms using earnouts and 
firms that do not, respectively. Panel F is showing the differences between the values 
reported in Panel D and E, where positive values represent more value creation for 
firms who are not using earnouts.  
In terms of fundamental value created for acquirers in general, no statistical 
significant value change is observed. This applies on all component parts as well as 
total value. Due to the lack of statistical significance, the findings can only be seen as 
indicative.  
This corresponds with the findings of Guest, Bild and Runsten (2010), who fail 
to provide evidence on an acquisition’s effect on fundamental value. However, they 
do provide evidence on the effect on acquirers, before adjusting for control firms’ 
results25. However, these results fail to provide any evidence on fundamental value 
effects of acquisitions, even for the acquirer before adjusting.    
When exclusively including acquirers which used earnouts, results remain 
unchanged. Conclusively, there is no evidence that earnouts have a significant cash 
flow effect on acquirers.  
 As mentioned in the introduction, earnouts is designed in a way that prevents 
integration of the target. Damodaran reports that synergy is seldom delivered in 
acquisitions, but it is still one of the main motives behind an acquisition. Hence, the 
time value of planned synergy should be part of the cost evaluation of using an 
                                                 
24 The components of total value is book value, dividends, residual income year 1 and 2 and terminal 
value, ref equation (4) 
25 Book value and dividends for acquirer at 5 percent level, residual income in year 1 and 2 plus total 
value at 1 percent. For abnormal, book value at 5 percent, terminal value at 10 percent.  
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earnout. With the results showing no significant difference between the two structures, 
one can say that time value of synergy represent a theoretical loss for acquirers using 
an earnout. In addition, Damodaran (2005) reported a 7.48% value increase on the 
announcement of the merger, something that is unattainable when using earnouts. 
 
 
 
TABLE 8 
The effect of acquisition on fundamental value of acquirer 
This table reports the fundamental value for the acquirers in the sample. Each acquirer is matched with 
its group of control firms, using the mean of the variable under test. Abnormal change in revenue is the 
acquirers change minus the mean of the control firm’s change.  The figures reported are means, with 
outliers removed. For the transactions in the sample, lower limit for outliers is -162 and upper limit 157. 
For the peer groups, the limits are respectively -174 and 154. Probabilities associated with t-tests are 
reported for each change, and are computed using the Student’s t-test. For panel A to E, a two-tailed 
paired t-test is computed, while for panel F it is used a two-tailed two-sample unequal variance 
(heteroscedastic) test, since the number of transactions using an earnout is different from the number of 
transactions not using an earnout. Also, there are no clear similarities between the two groups. In Table 
A, the values are normalised by the pre-takeover value by dividing each variable by the total pre-
acquisition value and multiplying with 100. This makes the total value 100 in each case, giving us the 
difference in total value in percentages, and the other variables (the components) as a percentage of 
total, explaining the how the total value is divided. The changes reported in Panel D and E is calculated 
the same way as Panel C, but the normalised pre values and post values are not reported. The difference 
between earnouts and non-earnouts is calculated by subtracting earnout transaction values from non-
earnout transaction values, meaning that a positive number indicate higher value for non-earnouts.  
Variable Fundamental value  
  
 
Acquirer t-test Control firm t-test Abnorm. t-test 
Panel A: Pre-acquisition value 
      Book value year 0 110,60 
 
104,74 
 
5,86 0,76 
Dividends year 0 9,97 
 
4,24 
 
5,73 0,12 
Residual income year 1 and 2 -2,15 
 
4,39 
 
-6,54 0,21 
Terminal value -18,42 
 
-13,37 
 
-5,05 0,78 
Total value 100,00 
 
100,00 
 
0,00 
 Panel B: Post-acquisition value 
      Book value year 0 110,88 
 
102,29 
 
8,58 0,68 
Dividends year 0 5,25 
 
5,40 
 
-0,15 0,97 
Residual income year 1 and 2 -0,32 
 
0,00 
 
-0,32 0,88 
Terminal value -6,18 
 
1,22 
 
-7,40 0,42 
Total value 109,62 
 
108,92 
 
0,71 0,26 
Panel C: Difference between post- 
and pre-acquisition 
      Book value year 0 0,28 0,89 -2,45 0,34 2,73 0,38 
Dividends year 0 -4,72 0,18 1,16 0,15 -5,88 0,11 
Residual income year 1 and 2 1,83 0,51 -4,39 0,44 6,22 0,31 
Terminal value 12,23 0,52 14,59 0,07 -2,36 0,91 
Total value 9,62 0,62 8,92 0,62 0,71 0,87 
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TABLE 8 (Continued) 
 
 
Acquirer t-test Control firm t-test Abnorm. t-test 
Dividends year 0 -1,04 0,51 0,18 0,78 -1,22 0,52 
Residual income year 1 and 2 16,43 0,51 5,94 0,17 10,49 0,83 
Terminal value 67,98 0,45 16,44 0,09 51,54 0,91 
Total value 84,66 0,37 19,18 0,30 65,48 0,83 
Panel E: Difference between 
acquirers post- and pre-
acquisition w/o earnout             
Book value year 0 0,21 0,92 -2,17 0,44 2,38 0,50 
Dividends year 0 -4,97 0,18 1,45 0,16 -6,42 0,12 
Residual income year 1 and 2 0,86 0,74 -7,48 0,29 8,33 0,44 
Terminal value 8,51 0,66 14,04 0,25 -5,53 0,97 
Total value 4,61 0,82 5,85 0,93 -1,24 0,86 
Panel F: Difference between 
earnouts and non-earnouts             
Book value year 0 -1,07 0,98 1,21 0,87 -2,28 0,86 
Dividends year 0 -3,93 0,21 1,28 0,28 -5,21 0,15 
Residual income year 1 and 2 -15,58 0,32 -13,42 0,10 -2,15 0,69 
Terminal value -59,47 0,89 -2,40 0,84 -57,07 0,95 
Total value -80,05 0,65 -13,34 0,46 -66,71 0,96 
 
 
8.2 H2: Revenue Growth Results 
Table 9 reports the results of the measurements done on annual and total change in 
revenue. Results are obtained using equations (9) (10) (11) and (12) as described in 
section 6. Panel A reports annual changes from years t-1 to t+3. As a measurement of 
total change in revenue, difference according to equation (9) is reported. Panel B 
reports the same results, but limited to the firms which used an earnout in the 
transaction. Panel C provides the same for firms which did not use an earnout. Panel 
D reports the differences between Panel B and C according to equations (11) and (12). 
Positive results indicate change in favour of non-earnouts.  
 The total change in revenue for acquirers is positive by 26%26. In addition, 
positive change of 20%27 from year t-1 to the actual year of the acquisition (t=0) are 
observed. Positive change is also observed for abnormal results, but can only be seen 
as indicative as it is lacking statistical significance.  However, looking at differences 
between earnout and non-earnout acquirers, no significant differences is observed. 
                                                 
26 Significant at 10 percent 
27 Significant at 5 percent 
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 As a suggested by Caselli et al. (2006), revenue is a commonly used 
performance measure linked to earnouts. The results of this thesis fails to provide 
evidence that it earnouts have a larger consequence on revenue than non-earnouts. 
This result is not as one would expect, since target management’s biggest incentives 
are related to the performance measures.  
However, if allowing for an insignificant interpretation, it may seem like 
earnouts have a positive effect on revenue. But, as described in section 3, it is also 
possible that this are results of acquirer’s accounting choices, or nonrecurring items 
such as sale of assets.  
 
TABLE 9 
The effect of acquisition on revenue of acquirer 
All reported figures are percentage changes. As the reported revenue is not a relative measure, only 
changes from year to year are reported. Each acquirer is matched with its group of control firms, using 
the mean of the variable under test. Abnormal change in revenue is the acquirers change minus the 
mean of the control firm’s change.  The figures reported are means, with outliers removed. For the 
transactions in the sample, lower limit for outliers is -66 and upper limit 124. For the peer groups, the 
limits are respectively -156 and 198. Probabilities associated with t-tests are reported for each change, 
and are computed using the Student’s t-test. For panel A to C, a two-tailed paired t-test is computed, 
while for panel D it is used a two-tailed two-sample unequal variance (heteroscedastic) test, since the 
number of transactions using an earnout is different from the number of transactions not using an 
earnout. Also, there are no clear similarities between the two groups. The difference between earnouts 
and non-earnouts is calculated by subtracting earnout transaction values from non-earnout transaction 
values, meaning that a positive number indicate higher value for non-earnouts. 
Variable Revenue 
  Acquirer t-test Control firm t-test Abnorm. t-test 
Panel A: Annual changes in 
revenue             
Revenue -1 to 0 0,20 0,05 0,10 0,05 0,11 0,11 
Revenue 0 to 1 0,07 0,40 0,00 0,27 0,07 0,83 
Revenue 1 to 2 0,00 0,13 -0,02 0,31 0,02 0,13 
Revenue 2 to 3 -0,02 0,43 -0,02 0,31 0,01 0,16 
∆ Revenue -1 to avg(1-3) 0,26 0,03 0,07 0,09 0,19 0,26 
Panel B: Changes in revenue 
earnouts 
      Revenue -1 to 0 0,32 0,34 0,00 0,37 0,33 0,32 
Revenue 0 to 1 0,20 0,21 0,06 0,36 0,14 0,94 
Revenue 1 to 2 -0,09 0,33 -0,03 0,36 -0,06 0,31 
Revenue 2 to 3 -0,02 0,41 -0,02 0,35 0,01 0,30 
∆ Revenue -1 to avg(1-3) 0,44 0,27 0,02 0,49 0,42 0,15 
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      TABLE 9 (Continued) 
Panel C: Changes in revenue 
non-earnouts Acquirer t-test Control firm t-test Abnorm. t-test 
 
Revenue -1 to 0 0,18 0,09 0,12 0,08 0,06 0,25 
Revenue 0 to 1 0,03 0,99 -0,02 0,62 0,05 0,81 
Revenue 1 to 2 0,02 0,26 -0,01 0,31 0,04 0,30 
Revenue 2 to 3 -0,02 0,27 -0,02 0,93 0,01 0,25 
∆ Revenue-1 to avg(1-3) 0,22 0,08 0,09 0,19 0,13 0,47 
Panel D: Difference between 
earnouts and non-earnouts 
      Revenue -1 to 0 -0,15 0,55 0,12 0,61 -0,27 0,52 
Revenue 0 to 1 -0,16 0,22 -0,08 0,40 -0,09 0,17 
Revenue 1 to 2 0,11 0,41 0,02 0,37 0,09 0,30 
Revenue 2 to 3 -0,00 0,19 0,00 0,35 0,00 1,00 
∆ Revenue -1 to avg(1-3) -0,22 0,51 0,07 0,61 -0,29 0,45 
 
 
8.3 H3: EBITDA Margin Results 
Changes and differences in change in EBITDA margin are reported in Table 10. 
Again, changes are reported according to equations (9) (10) (11) and (12). Panel A 
reports realised EBITDA margins in the sample years. Panel B to E reports the same 
type of measures as Table 5 Panels A to D, but on EBITDA margin in place of 
revenue. 
As EBITDA is one of the more commonly used performance measures in an 
earnout, it is expected that acquirers using one experience better results than others. 
As mentioned in section 3.2, exclusively trying to increase the performance measure 
may cause target management to cut back on investments for the future (e.g. training, 
R&D etc.). Because this is a risk introduced solely by the inclusion of an earnout, one 
would expect that growth in performance measure (i.e. EBITDA) should compensate 
for the increased risk exposure.   
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 The observed abnormal EBITDA margin in year t=0 is 12.5%28, a result that 
according Christian and Jones (2004) plays a compensating role for earnings in 
explaining value of acquisition in year t=0. But, looked at isolated this measure 
provides no measure of change. From year t=0 to t+1 however, it can be observed a 
negative change of 2%29 before adjusting. Further, it can also be observed a decrease 
in EBITDA margin for the whole period. Compared to control firms, none of the 
observations are significant.   
The only significant difference between earnouts and non-earnouts is a 
positive change of 8.1% in favor of non-earnout acquirers from year t+2 to t+330. The 
remainder of the observed differences are however not statistical significant, and the 
results obtained is only indicative. Thus, no evidence pro earnout can be found. 
Interestingly, the acquirers which used an earnout experienced significantly lower 
earnout margins than its counterparts in t+2 to t+3. Damodaran (2005) reported that 
approximately 40% of acquirers manage to create synergy, and this might be a result 
of that.  
Looking at the findings of Kohers and Ang (2000), targets that are under 
earnouts receive on average 62% of the total earnout. Combined with the statements 
of Caselli et al. (2006) that EBITDA are one of the more common used performance 
measures, the lack of findings may be a a surprise.  
 
  
                                                 
28 Significant at 1 percent 
29 Significant at 10 percent 
30 Significant at 5 percent 
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TABLE 10 
The effect of acquisition on EBITDA margin of acquirer 
Reported figures in Panel B to D are percentage changes, while in Panel A it is the observed margin in the 
respective years. Each acquirer is matched with its group of control firms, using the mean of the variable 
under test. Abnormal change in revenue is the acquirers change minus the mean of the control firm’s 
change.  The figures reported are means, with outliers removed. For the transactions in the sample, lower 
limit for outliers is -26 and upper limit 8. For the peer groups, the limits are respectively -24 and 27. 
Probabilities associated with t-tests are reported for each change, and are computed using the Student’s t-
test. For panel A to D, a two-tailed paired t-test is computed, while for panel E it is used a two-tailed two-
sample unequal variance (heteroscedastic) test, since the number of transactions using an earnout is 
different from the number of transactions not using an earnout. Also, there are no clear similarities 
between the two groups. The difference between earnouts and non-earnouts is calculated by subtracting 
earnout transaction values from non-earnout transaction values, meaning that a positive number indicate 
higher value for non-earnouts. 
Variable EBITDA margin 
 
Acquirer t-test 
Control 
firm t-test Abnorm. t-test 
Panel A: EBITDA margins 
 
          
EBITDA% year -1 0,168   0,028   0,140 0,33 
EBITDA% year 0 0,168   0,043   0,125 0,01 
EBITDA% year 1 0,148   0,058   0,090 0,38 
EBITDA% year 2 0,174   0,032   0,142 0,04 
EBITDA% year 3 0,153   0,057   0,096 0,55 
Panel B: Annual changes in EBITDA 
margin Acquirer t-test 
Control 
firm t-test Abnorm. t-test 
 
EBITDA% -1 to 0 0,000 0,28 0,015 0,40 -0,015 0,26 
EBITDA% 0 to 1 -0,020 0,09 0,015 0,80 -0,035 0,39 
EBITDA% 1 to 2 0,027 0,11 -0,026 0,96 0,052 0,23 
EBITDA% 2 to 3 -0,022 0,21 0,025 0,49 -0,047 0,27 
∆ EBITDA% -1 to avg(1-3) -0,010 0,00 0,037 0,48 -0,047 0,03 
Panel C: Changes in EBITDA margin 
earnouts             
EBITDA% -1 to 0 -0,012 0,69 0,015 0,81 -0,027 0,57 
EBITDA% 0 to 1 -0,041 0,56 0,015 0,03 -0,056 0,44 
EBITDA% 1 to 2 0,050 0,42 -0,026 0,40 0,076 0,36 
EBITDA% 2 to 3 -0,088 0,05 0,025 0,62 -0,113 0,18 
∆ EBITDA% -1 to avg(1-3) -0,049 0,01 0,021 0,70 -0,070 0,19 
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TABLE 10 (Continued) 
Panel D: Changes in EBITDA margin 
non-earnouts Acquirer t-test 
Control 
firm t-test Abnorm. t-test 
 
EBITDA% -1 to 0 0,021 0,20 -0,054 0,49 0,076 0,22 
EBITDA% 0 to 1 -0,034 0,08 0,013 0,72 -0,047 0,46 
EBITDA% 1 to 2 0,021 0,18 0,005 0,52 0,017 0,43 
EBITDA% 2 to 3 -0,007 0,86 0,024 0,28 -0,031 0,57 
∆ EBITDA% -1 to avg(1-3) -0,001 0,00 -0,030 0,36 0,029 0,15 
Panel E: Difference between earnouts 
and non-earnouts             
EBITDA% -1 to 0 0,033 0,33 -0,069 0,50 0,103 0,24 
EBITDA% 0 to 1 0,006 1,00 -0,002 0,89 0,008 0,76 
EBITDA% 1 to 2 -0,028 0,67 0,030 0,91 -0,059 0,70 
EBITDA% 2 to 3 0,081 0,04 -0,001 0,63 0,082 0,58 
∆ EBITDA% -1 to avg(1-3) 0,048 0,30 -0,052 0,55 0,099 0,34 
 
 
9 CONCLUSIONS 
By examining a sample of 33 Nordic transactions, I have investigated what motivates 
firms to choose an earnout in their acquisition agreement. From the perspective of 
fundamental value, EBITDA margin and revenue I find no statistical evidence that 
there exist any difference in changes for firms who use earnouts and firms who do not. 
As representatives for earnout performance measures, I would expect that firms using 
earnouts experienced a more positive change in EBITDA margin and revenue 
compared to firms who do not. The only observed difference however, is the change 
in EBITDA margin from year t+2 to t+3, in favor of non-earnouts. All other observed 
differences between the two contract structures are insignificant. 
 This is interesting because in the case of an earnout, acquirers take on 
additional costs. The additional costs derives from both facilitating the earnout, and 
because it prevent integration of the target. If the motive of acquisition is more 
positive cash flow consequences, my results suggest that earnouts are not being used 
rationally. However, looking back on previous literature the earnout serve purposes 
which might provide gains in the long run, especially in terms of retaining human 
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capital. Thus, I fail to provide clear answers on why firms use earnouts in their 
acquisition agreements.  
 But, readers need to be aware that this study has limitations. The data set being 
examined is relatively small, increasing the likelihood of being affected by non-
relevant changes. For example, nonrecurring items that are not captured by, or affect 
the min/max range for outlier determination may have an effect on the total result. In 
addition, by only including one to five firms in the control groups, it is less likely that 
these groups manage to capture market and industry trends. Also, the model is not 
capturing changes in risk for individual acquirers, only for the market as whole31. This 
is due to lack of time series beta values for individual firms.  
 For further research, I would recommend to increase the size of the dataset. 
Also, as earnouts is a tool for shifting risk, the development in risk for acquirers 
should be examined. It would be interesting to see whether the situation changes 
during the earnout period. In addition, by expanding the time period, it may be 
possible to examine whether earnouts have a long term effect on the combined firm. 
However, by introducing years beyond the earnout period it is more likely that effects 
which cannot be linked to the actual earnout is captured. This will require in-debt 
analysis of a large number of transactions, especially considering the new, potential 
consequences of earnout fair value adjustments on earnings.  
  
                                                 
31 Through changes in risk free rates, determined by 10-year government bonds 
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11 APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: List of transactions  
TABLE 1 
List of transactions 
Acquirer Orig Target Orig Deal year Deal value 
thEUR 
Earnout 
Stora enso oyj FI Consolidated papers inc. US 2000 5 025 510 No 
Fortum oyj FI Birka energi ab SE 2002 3 657 175 No 
Danske bank a/s DK Realdanmark a/s DK 2001 3 561 967 No 
Norsk hydro asa NO Vaw aluminium ag DE 2002 3 024 000 No 
Dsv a/s DK Xb luxembourg holdings 1 sa LU 2008 750 000 No 
Modern times group mtg ab SE Nova television ead BG 2008 620 000 No 
Carlsberg a/s DK Feldschlösschen getränke 
holding ag 
CH 
2000 
563 399 No 
Hafslund asa NO Viken energinett as NO 2002 413 125 No 
Outokumpu oyj FI Sogepar spa IT 2008 335 000 No 
Electrolux ab SE Email ltd's household appliance 
making unit 
AU 
2001 
293 155 No 
Svenska handelsbanken ab SE Midtbank a/s DK 2001 280 694 No 
Holmen ab SE Papelera peninsular sa ES 2000 244 043 No 
Prosafe asa NO Nortrans offshore ltd SI 2001 223 966 No 
Hexagon ab SE Brown & sharpe manufacturing 
company's metrology business 
US 
2001 
202 338 Yes 
Atlas copco ab SE Ingersoll-rand drilling solutions US 2004 184 523 No 
Scania ab SE Beers nv NL 2001 142 800 No 
Odfjell asa NO Seachem NO 2000 125 093 No 
Alfa laval ab SE Tranter phe inc. US 2005 123 450 No 
New wave group ab SE Cutter & buck inc. US 2007 117 062 No 
H lundbeck a/s DK Synaptic pharmaceutical 
corporation 
US 
2003 
110 413 No 
Sjælsø gruppen a/s DK Ikast byggeindustri a/s DK 2006 107 256 No 
Norske skogindustrier asa NO Pan asia paper co., pte ltd SG 2005 775,404.00 Yes 
Swedbank ab SE Tas commerzbank ag UA 2007 722,990.00 Yes 
Cybercom group ab SE Plenware oy FI 2008 54,900.00 Yes 
Tomra systems as NO Orwak group ab SE 2005 21,407.69 Yes 
Vmetro asa NO Transtech dsp ltd GB 2004 17,400.43 Yes 
Birdstep technology asa NO Alice systems ab SE 2004 12,482.12 Yes 
Farstad shipping asa NO International offshore services GB 2003 73 647 No 
Vbg group ab SE 
Edscha ag's sliding roofs for 
trucks and trailers division DE 2005 
37 622 
No 
Vacon oyj FI 
Tb wood's corporation's 
adjustable speed drivers business US 2008 
19 700 
No 
Elanders ab SE Kape com ab SE 2000 15 532 No 
Tulikivi oyj FI Kermansavi oy FI 2006 13 100 No 
Beijer alma ab SE Elimag industri ab SE 2001 11 781 No 
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APPENDIX B: List of control firms 
TABLE 2 
Control firms 
Acquirer Ctrl firm 1 Ctrl firm 2 Ctrl firm 3 Ctrl firm 4 Ctrl firm 5 
Stora enso oyj Metsa Board Rottneros Bergs Timber   
Fortum oyj Arendals Fos.     
Danske bank a/s Nordea Sandnes Sb.    
Norsk hydro asa Hoganas Profilgr. SSAB   
Dsv a/s Belships EMS NC Carriers Solvang Concordia 
Modern times 
group mtg ab 
Gyldendal Ilkka North Media   
Carlsberg a/s Harboes Royal unibrew    
Hafslund asa Arendals fos.     
Outokumpu oyj Hoganas Profilgr. SSAB   
Electrolux ab Lammhults Martela Fiskars Expedit  
Svenska 
handelsbanken ab 
Nordea Sandnes Sb.    
Holmen ab Metsa Board Rottneros Bergs Timber   
Prosafe asa Ganger Rolf PGS Subsea7   
Hexagon ab OEM Pricer Efore Roblon  
Atlas copco ab Rias SMigratronix Skako Kesl  
Scania ab Rias SMigratronix Skako Kesl  
Odfjell asa Belships EMS NC Carriers Solvang Concordia 
Alfa laval ab Rias SMigratronix Skako Kesl  
New wave group 
ab 
Gabriel Saga    
H lundbeck a/s Alk-Abello Active biotech Artimplant   
Sjælsø gruppen a/s Asgaard Atrium Lj. Castellum Fastpartner  
Norske 
skogindustrier asa 
Metsa Board Rottneros Bergs Timber   
Swedbank ab Nordea Sandnes Sb.    
Cybercom group 
ab 
Oniva Ind&Fin MSC   
Tomra systems as Rias SMigratronix Skako Kesla  
Vmetro asa OEM Pricer Efore Roblon  
Birdstep 
technology asa 
Oniva Ind&Fin    
Farstad shipping 
asa 
Ganger Rolf PGS Subsea7   
Vbg group ab Haldex Mekonomen Nokian Scan. Brake  
Vacon oyj OEM Pricer Efore Roblon  
Elanders ab B&B tools Intermail    
Tulikivi oyj NIBE Byggma Uponor Dantherm  
Beijer alma ab Rias SMigratronix Skako Kesla  
 
 
